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COMMENT
THE UNITED STATES AND SHRIMP IMPORT PROHIBITIONS:
REFUSING TO SURRENDER THE AMERICAN GOLIATH ROLE
IN CONSERVATION
The debate over environmental conservation versus liberalized trade
reached the focal point of academic discussions again after the recent rul-
ing of the World Trade Organization's [hereinafter "WTO"] Appellate
Body on the United States - Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products) Ruling in favor of complainants, India, Malaysia, Paki-
stan and Thailand, the WTO Appellate Body found that the United
States' unilateral trade measures to assist in preserving endangered sea
turtles were unfairly implemented against the complainants.2 The WTO
found that while many conservation goals of the United States are genu-
ine, no implementation plan which discriminates against less developed
nations should stand. Environmental conservation and liberalized trade
often create academic debate over the benefits and detriments of both. It
may be too hard to resist the human propensity to spend time arguing
over an issue instead of simply attempting to work toward solutions. Ar-
guably, the conflict between "environmentalists" and "free traders" does
not exist except in the minds of extremists. Naturally, few issues do not
have flipsides, both good and bad. Nonetheless, solutions which attempt
to use the power of one strong nation, to force compliance from other
nations will fail in the end. Progress can rarely be made without under-
standing all sides of an issue, and the important role that each side plays.
In reality, there may be no conflict between environmental conservation
and liberalized trade. Perhaps both may simply exist on the same path of
an intricately interwoven, crowded world.
In Shrimp Imports, the Appellate Body of the WTO concluded that
the 1996 Guidelines for the implementation of conservation measures
under the Endangered Species Act 3 [hereinafter "Section 609"], calling
1. See WTO Appellate Body Report on United States - Import Prohibition of Cer-
tain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (visited
May 22, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm>, also available in 1998 WL
720123 (WTO) [hereinafter "Shrimp Imports"].
2. See id.
3. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §1537 (1998), amending the Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et seq.
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for the protection and conservation of sea turtles, could not be justified,
as they were implemented, as an environmental exception4 under Article
XX5. of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). 6 The
United States offered numerous unacceptable excuses for an obviously
discriminatory measure, proffered under the guise of a selfless attempt to
protect an endangered natural resource.7
4. To date, only one Panel has come close to justifying an environmental law under
the environmental exceptions on Article XX grounds. GATT Panel Report on United
States - Taxes on Automobiles, WTO Doc. DS/31/R (Oct. 11, 1994) (visited May 22,
1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/panel.htm>, also available in 1994 WL 910937
(GATT) [hereinafter "Auto Taxes"]. See also Eric Phillips, Note, World Trade and the
Environment: The CAFE Case, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 827 (1996); Steve Charnovitz, Ex-
ploring the Environmental Exceptions in GA7T Article XX, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1991,
vol.25 no.5, 37 (1991).
5. See Appellate Body on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 1 187-88.
6. See General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, amended by Final Act Embodying Results of the Uru-
guay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, April 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RE-
SULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
"GATT"].
7. Two previous GATT Panel decisions on the Tuna-Dolphin controversy were
hauntingly similar to the Shrimp Imports dispute. The Tuna-Dolphin controversy started
with the relationship that exists between dolphins and yellowfin tuna in the Eastern Trop-
ical Pacific Ocean. The controversy actually revolved around the purse-seine fishing tech-
nique used to capture tuna. Dolphins, which swim over schools of yellowfin tuna, are
herded together. The tunaboat then encircles the dolphins with a net which is drawn to-
gether at the bottom. In this manner, yellowfin tuna are caught. Unfortunately, dolphins
are often wounded or killed in the hauling process. In response to outcries by environ-
mentalists, the U.S. enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA"), which im-
posed a general moratorium on the taking and importation of marine mammals and
marine mammal products. See 16 U.S.C. §1371(a) (Supp. 1991). The ban was subject to
limited exceptions that required the issuance of permits. See id. at § 1373. The permits
may only be issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") if the particular
mammal is not considered depleted by more than 60% of its historic population levels.
See 58 Fed. Reg. 58285 (1993). For dolphins, the MMPA was applied differently between
U.S. and foreign fishing fleets. In 1984, Congress statutorily issued a permit to the Amer-
ican Tunaboat Association ("ATA") to avoid the complexities of the permit process for
U.S. fleets. See 16 U.S.C. 1374(b)(2) (1985). See also Earth Island Institute v. Brown, 25
Envt'l L. Rep. 20,560, 865 F. Supp. 1364, 1368 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 1994); Earth Island
Institute v. Brown, 16 I.T.R.D. 1321, 17 F.3d 1241 (Mar. 3, 1994); Earth Island Institute
v. Brown, 16 I.T.R.D. 1914, 28 F3d 76 (June 28, 1994); Earth Island Institute v. Brown,
513 U.S. 999 (Nov. 14, 1994), cert. denied. These types of discriminatory affects led
Mexico and later members of the European Union to question the validity of the MMPA
under the GATT Agreement. See GATT Panel Report on United States - Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna, WTO Doc. WT/DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), GAT B.I.S.D. (391h Supp.)
(1993), available in 1991 WL 771248 (GATT) (1991), not adopted [hereinafter "Tuna
I"]; and GATT Panel Report on the United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
[Vol. 23
SHRIMP IMPORT PROHIBITIONS
This paper explores a different perspective on the environmental
conservation versus liberalized trade debate in the context of the recent
WTO Appellate Body decision in the Shrimp Imports dispute. A brief le-
gal background section gives attention to the history of the WTO and
dispute resolution under GATT. First, the paper examines the initial
Shrimp Imports Panel Report8 and the issues raised on appeal. Part III of-
fers the Appellate Body's ruling in Shrimp Imports. Part IV scrutinizes
the Appellate Body's decision which opened the door to the possible fu-
ture acceptance of amicus briefs from interest groups and examines Arti-
cle XX(b), Article XX(g) and the Preamble to Article XX. It looks at the
effects of the use of "might" in the international arena and offers possi-
ble solutions to the environment and trade conflict.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
In Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944, national representatives
of the United States and Great Britain gathered to create a mechanism
for liberalizing trade.9 It was believed that liberalized trade would create
a more efficient use of labor and natural resources, while increasing stan-
dards of living.' 0 In 1947, the Bretton Woods Conference produced the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for a proposed International
Trade Organization ("ITO")." Since the U.S. never ratified the ITO,
other members abandoned the organization. 12 The first six rounds of
GATT multilateral trade negotiations, from the Kennedy Round in 1947
to the mid 1960s, focused on tariff reduction.13 The GATT became both
WTO Doc. WTIDS29/R (June 16, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994), available in 1994 WL
907620 (GATT), not adopted [hereinafter "Tuna IF'].
8. WTO Panel Report on United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS/58/R (May 15, 1998), 33 I.L.M. 832 (1998), also
available in 1998 WL 256632 (WTO) [hereinafter "Shrimp Imports"].
9. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 27-39 (1989).
10. See id. at 8-17.
11. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. There has been some debate as to whether or not GATI is bind-
ing under U.S. law. For both sides of the debate compare Ronald A. Brand, The Status of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J.
INT'L. L. 479 (1990), with John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
in the United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 250 (1967).
12. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990).
13. See generally John Odell and Barry Eichengreen, The United States, the ITO,
and the WTO: Exit Options, Agent Slack, and Presidential Leadership, in THE WTO AS
AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 181 (Anne 0. Kreuger ed., 1998).
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the Agreement and an organization to fill the void left by the failure of
the ITO.' 4 The GATT organization provided a forum for trade negotia-
tions and for settlement of disputes. 15 By the Tokyo Round in the 1970s,
the focus had shifted to negotiations on the reduction of non-tariff
barriers. 16
On April 15, 1994, the Uruguay Round progressed a step further by
strengthening and developing "GATT 1947" into "GATT 1994." 17 To
further reduce tariffs and to establish rules for non-tariff barriers, the
Uruguay Round created the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). 18 The
new WTO formalized dispute resolution, incorporated the original GATT
rules and added new rules. 19 The three founding rules for liberalized
trade upon which the GATT Agreement and all side agreements were
built include: (1) Article 1,20 the most-favored-nation principle, prohibited
discriminatory trade practices between contracting members and required
that all contracting members must be treated as favorably as any other
member; (2) Article 11121 required parties to treat foreign and domestic
parties alike; (3) Article X122 limited the use of quantitative restrictions
such as quotas .2  Recognizing that these obligations might occasionally
have to breached, the GATT parties created Article XX which allowed
for a variety of exceptions including "human, animal or plant, life or
14. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATr LEGAL SYSTEM 13
(1987). See also Odell, supra note 13, at 182.
15. See OLIVER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL
TRADE SYSTEM 5 (1985).
16. Some of the Tokyo Round codes included the Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade, April 12, 1979, 1186 U.N.T.S. 276, GATT B.I.S.D. (26"h Supp.) at 8 (1980);
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 12, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26 th Supp.) at 56
(1980) [Subsidies Code]; Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat, GATT B.I.S.D. (26 th
Supp.) at 84 (1980); and Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, GATT B.I.S.D.
(26"' Supp.) at 154 (1980).
17. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990).
18. See GATT, supra note 6.
19. See e.g., Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex IA, Law
& Practice of the World Trade Organization 271 (Joseph F. Dennin ed., 1996); Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex 1A, Law & Practice of the World Trade Organiza-
tion 135 (Joseph F Dennin ed., 1996); and Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, Annex IA, Law & Practice of the World Trade Organization 59
(Joseph F. Dennin ed., 1996).
20. See GATI', supra note 6, art. 1.
21. See id., art. III.
22. See id., art. XI.
23. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 129-31 (1989).
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health" and "conservation of exhaustible natural resources."' 24 GATT
Panels have interpreted these exceptions narrowly. To date only one pre-
vious Panel has come close to justifying an environmental law on Article
XX grounds.2 5 In United States - Taxes on Automobiles [hereinafter
"Auto Taxes"], the Panel was reviewing the Corporate Average Fuel
Economy ("CAFE") law which required manufacturers of autos to meet
certain minimum fuel efficiency standards for the entire fleet of autos
that they sell in the United States. 26 While the Panel found that important
elements of the CAFE law violated GATT, they also found much of the
law to be compatible with GATT, thereby offering support to those who
believe that environmental protection can coexist with the WTO system. 27
H. THE CASE
In 1989, the United States enacted Section 609,28 which called upon
the U.S. Secretary of State, in consultation with the U.S. Secretary of
Commerce, to initiate negotiations for the development of bilateral or
multilateral agreements for the protection and conservation of sea turtles,
in particular with foreign governments of countries engaged in commer-
24. For the text of Article XX see infra note 74.
25. See Auto Taxes Panel Report, supra note 4.
26. See Phillips, supra note 4, at 828.
27. See Auto Taxes Panel Report, supra note 4, U 5.57-.59.
28. Section 609(a) of the 1996 Guidelines directs the Secretary of State to:
(1) initiate negotiations as soon as possible for the development of bilateral or
multilateral agreements with other nations for the protection and conservation
of such species of sea turtles;
(2) initiate negotiations as soon as possible with all foreign governments which
are engaged in, or which have persons or companies engaged in, commercial
fishing operations which, as determined by the Secretary of Commerce, may
affect adversely such species of sea turtles, for the purpose of entering into
bilateral and multilateral treaties with such countries to protect such species
of sea turtles;
(3) encourage such other agreements to promote the purposes of this section
with other nations for the protection of specific ocean and land regions
which are of special significance to the health and stability of such species of
sea turtles;
(4) initiate the amendment of any existing international treaty for the protection
and conservation of such species of sea turtles to which the United States is
a party in order to make such treaty consistent with the purposes and policies
of this section; and
(5) provide to the Congress by not later than one year after the date of enact-
ment of this section: . . .
•(C) a full report on:
(i) the results of his efforts under this section; . . . See 61 Fed. Reg.
17342 (April 19, 1996) [hereinafter "1996 Guidelines"].
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cial fishing operations likely to adversely affect sea turtles. 29 Under Sec-
tion 609, shrimp harvested with technology that may adversely affect cer-
tain sea turtles could not be imported into the U.S. unless the President
"certified to Congress by May 1, 1991, and annually thereafter, that the
harvesting nation has a regulatory program and an incidental take rate
comparable to that of the U.S., or that the particular fishing environment
of the harvesting nation does not pose a threat to sea turtles." 30 The U.S.
issued guidelines in 199131 and 199332 for assessing the comparability of
foreign regulatory programs with the U.S. program and the implementa-
tion of Section 609.33 Following those guidelines, Section 609 was ap-
plied only to countries of the Carribean/West Atlantic. 34
In December 1995, the U.S. Court of International Trade ("CIT") in
Earth Island Institute v. Christopher35 found the 1991 and 1993 guide-
lines illegal insofar as they limited the geographic scope of Section 609
to shrimp harvested in the wider Carribean/Western Atlantic area. The
CIT directed the U.S. Department of State to prohibit, no later than May
29. See Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *4, 17.
30. Id.
31. To be considered comparable to the U.S. program, the foreign nations program
required, among other things, a commitment to engage in a statistically reliable and veri-
fiable scientific program to reduce the mortality of sea turtles associated with shrimp fish-
ing. Foreign nations were given three years for the complete phase in of a comparable
program. The guidelines also stated that the import restriction did not apply to aquacul-
ture shrimp (produced by farming as opposed to being caught in the wild), whose har-
vesting does not adversely affect sea turtles. See Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note
8, at *4, 18. The complete version of the 1991 Guidelines can be found at 56 Fed. Reg.
1051 (Jan. 10, 1991).
32. The 1993 U.S. revised guidelines required affected nations to maintain their
commitment to require TEDs on all commercial shrimp trawl vessels by May 1, 1994 in
order to receive certification in 1993. The foreign nation must also be able to demonstrate
the use of TEDs on a significant number of shrimp trawl vessels by May 1, 1993. To re-
ceive certification after 1993, affected nations were required to use TEDs on all their
shrimp trawl vessels with a limited number of exemptions. The main exemption is for
vessels whose nets are retrieved by manual means as opposed to mechanical means.
These vessels are not required to use TEDs because the lack of mechanical retrieval sys-
tems restricts tow times to a short duration, thereby limiting the threats of incidental
drowning of sea turtles. The 1993 guidelines eliminated the option of a mere commitment
to engage in a scientific program to reduce the mortality of sea turtles due to shrimp
trawling. See Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *4, 19. The complete 1993
guidelines can be found at 58 Fed. Reg. 9015 (Feb. 18, 1993).
33. See Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *4, 18-19.
34. The 1991 guidelines limited the scope of Section 609 to the wider Carribean/
Western Atlantic region, and more specifically to: Mexico, Belize, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Columbia, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Su-
riname, French Guyana, and Brazil.
35. 19 Ct. Int'l Trade 1461, 913 F. Supp. 559 (CIT 1995).
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1, 1996, the importation of shrimp or the products of shrimp wherever
harvested in the wild with commercial fishing technology which may ad-
versely affect those species of sea turtles governed by the regulations of
the Secretary of Commerce.36
In order to comply with the U.S. CIT order, the Department of State
issued new guidelines in April 1996.17 The new guidelines extended the
scope of Section 609 to shrimp harvested in all countries. Under the new
guidelines, as of May 1, 1996, all shipments of shrimp or shrimp prod-
ucts into the U.S. were to be accompanied by a declaration, the "Shrimp
Exporter's Declaration" form, attesting that the shrimp were harvested
"either under conditions that do not adversely affect sea turtles or in wa-
ters subject to the jurisdiction of a nation already certified under Section
609."38 According to the 1996 Guidelines:
Shrimp or shrimp products harvested in conditions that do not af-
fect sea turtles" include: " (a) Shrimp harvested in an aquacul-
ture facility . . . ; (b) Shrimp harvested by commercial shrimp
trawl vessels using TEDs comparable in effectiveness to those re-
quired in the United States; (c) Shrimp harvested exclusively by
means that do not involve the retrieval of fishing nets by
mechanical devices or by vessels using gear that, in accordance
with the U.S. program .. .would not require TEDs; (d) Species
of shrimp, such as the pandlid species harvested in areas in
which sea turtles do not occur.39
The 1996 Guidelines even determined the criteria for certifying a
harvesting nation whose fishing environment "does not pose a threat of
incidental taking of sea turtles in the course of commercial shrimp trawl
harvesting" 4 as including: "(a) Any harvesting nation without any of the
relevant species of sea turtles occurring in waters subject to its jurisdic-
tion; (b) Any harvesting nation that harvests shrimp exclusively by
means that do not pose a threat to sea turtles, e.g. any nation that har-
36. The Department of State requested a modification of the judgment which would
allow a one-year extension for the worldwide enforcement of Section 609. The State De-
partment argued, inter alia, that many of the major shrimp exporting nations would likely
be unable to implement a comparable program by May 1, 1996. The U.S. CIT refused
the requested extension and confirmed the May 1, 1996, deadline. See Earth Island Insti-
tute v. Christopher, 18 I.T.R.D. 1469, 922 F Supp. 616 (CIT 1996). For a more detailed
history of this line of cases see infra notes 168, 223 and 224.
37. See 1996 Guidelines, supra note 28.
38. Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *5, [ 21.
39. 1996 Guidelines, supra note 28.
40. Id., § 609 (b)(2)(C).
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vests shrimp exclusively by artisanal means; (c) Any nation whose com-
mercial shrimp trawling operations take place exclusively in waters sub-
ject to its jurisdiction in which sea turtles do not occur."' 41 Further
conditions to be taken into account in determining the comparability of
foreign programs included "other measures the harvesting nation under-
takes to protect sea turtles, including national programs to protect nesting
beaches and other habitats, prohibitions on the directed take of sea tur-
tles, national enforcement and compliance programs, and participation in
any international agreement for the protection and conservation of sea
turtles."
42
In October 1996, the U.S. CIT ruled that the embargo on shrimp
and shrimp products enacted by Section 609 applied to all shrimp or
shrimp products harvested in the wild by citizens or vessels of nations
which have not been certified. 43 A later U.S. CIT decision clarified that
shrimp harvested by manual methods which did not harm sea turtles
could still be imported even if the country had not been certified under
Section 609.44 At that time, the U.S. CIT refused to postpone the world-
wide enforcement of Section 609.41
A. The Panel Decision46
In a letter dated October 8, 1996, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and
Thailand requested consultations with the United States47 pursuant to Ar-
ticle 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set-
tlement of Disputes ("DSU") 48 and Article XXII:1 of GATT. 49 The let-
ters concerned the proposed U.S. ban on certain shrimp and shrimp
41. Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *5, T 23 (quoting 1996 Guide-
lines, supra note 28).
42. Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *6, 24 (quoting 1996 Guide-
lines, supra note 28).
43. See Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 18 I.T.R.D. 2344, 942 F. Supp. 597
(CIT 1996). See infra notes 168, 223 and 224; and supra note 36.
44. See Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 18 I.T.R.D. 2516, 948 F. Supp. 1062
(CIT 1996).
45. See Earth Island Institute, 948 F. Supp at 1070. For a full listing of countries
certified as of January 1, 1998, see Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *6, T
26.
46. See Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8.
47. This letter, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/1, can be found on Westlaw's electronic
database at 1996 WL 908914 (WTO).
48. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 112, art. 4 (1994) [hereinafter "DSU"], Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1I LEGAL INSTRUMENTS RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND; 33 I.L.M. 112, art. 4 (1994).
49. See GATT, supra note 6, art. XXII: 1.
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products under Section 609 of U.S. Public Law 101-16250 and the "Re-
vised Notice of Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign
Programs for the Protection of Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Opera-
tions."'" Consultations held on November 19, 1996, failed to reach a sat-
isfactory solution. Upon the requests of Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan and
India,52 the WTO Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") established a panel
to examine, under Article XXIII:2 of GATT and Article 6 of the DSU,
the embargo implemented through the enactment of Section 609 of the
1996 Guidelines and the issuance of judicial decisions interpreting the
law and its regulations.53
The United States argued that the ban on shrimp and shrimp prod-
ucts was proposed to protect against the incidental killing of sea turtles5 4
during shrimp harvesting. All sea turtles that occur in U.S. waters are
listed as endangered or threatened species under the Endangered Species
Act of 1973 ("ESA"). The National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS")
developed turtle excluder devices ("TEDs") through a program aimed at
reducing the mortality of sea turtles in shrimp trawls.55 A TED is a grid
trapdoor installed inside a trawling net that allows shrimp to pass to the
back of the net while directing sea turtles and other large objects unin-
50. Codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1996), amending the Endangered Species Act of
1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et seq.
51. See 1996 Guidelines, supra note 28.
52. The requests of each party can be found in Westlaw's electronic database at:
Malaysia and Thailand, WTO Doc. WT/DS/58/6 (Jan. 19, 1997) available in 1997 WL
423602; Pakistan, WTO Doc. WT/DS/58/7 (Feb. 7, 1997) available in 1997 WL 424044;
and India, WTO Doc. WT/DS/58/8 (Mar. 4, 1997) available in 1997 WL 371075.
53. For a more detailed account see Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at
*1-*2, U91 1-10. Documentation of this meeting can be found at the World Trade Organi-
zation, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/31.
54. There are seven recognized species of sea turtles: the green turtle, loggerhead,
flatback, hawksbill, leatherback, olive ridley, and Kemp's ridley. These species can be
found in both subtropical and tropical areas. Sea turtles live at sea where they migrate be-
tween foraging and nesting grounds. Adult females nest in multi-year cycles, coming
ashore to lay clutches of about 100 eggs in nests they dig on the beach. Few eggs survive
to reach the age of reproduction. Sea turtles have been exploited for their meat, shells
and eggs. Furthermore, they are indirectly affected by man's activities through incidental
captures in fisheries, destruction of their habitats and pollution of the oceans. Presently,
all species of sea turtles are included in Appendix I of the 1973 Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species ("CITES"). All species except for the Australian
flatback are listed in Appendices I and II of the 1979 Convention on Migratory Species
of Wild Animals ("CMS") and appear in the IUCN Red List as endangered or vulnera-
ble. See Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *3, I 11-13.
55. See Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *3, H 15-16. For a visual
demonstration of a Turtle Excluder Device see <http://www.earthisland.org/strp/ted.html>
(visited Jan. 5, 1999).
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tentionally caught out of the net.56
India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand ("the complainants") asked
the WTO Panel to find that Section 609 of U.S. Public Law 101-162 and
its implementing measures: "a) were contrary to Articles XI:I and XIII:1
of GATT 1994; b) were not covered by the exceptions under Article
XX(b) and (g) of GATT 1994; c) nullified or impaired benefits accruing
to complainants within the meaning of Article XXIII: l(a) of GATT
1994." 57 Opposing those arguments, the U.S. requested that the panel
find that Section 609 and its implementing measures fell within the scope
of Article XX, paragraphs (b) and (g) of GATT 1994.58
During the proceedings, the Panel received two amicus briefs sub-
mitted by non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"). 59 The first was
submitted by the Center for Marine Conservation ("CMC") and the
Center for International Environmental Law ("CIEL"). The second was
submitted by the World Wide Fund for Nature ("WWF"). The NGOs
sent copies to the Panel and to the parties to the dispute. The complain-
ants asked the Panel to disregard the content of the amicus briefs.6° The
United States stressed that the Panel could seek information from any
relevant source under Article 13 of the DSU.61 After consideration, the
Panel decided:
Accepting non-requested amicus briefs from non-governmental
sources would be, in our opinion, incompatible with the provi-
sions of the DSU as currently applied. We therefore informed the
parties that we did not intend to take these documents into con-
sideration. We observed, moreover, that it was usual practice for
parties to put forward whatever documents they considered rele-
vant to support their case and that, if any party in the present
dispute wanted to put forward these documents, or parts of them,
as part of their own submissions to the Panel, they were free to
do so. If this were the case, the other parties would have two
weeks to respond to the additional material. We noted that the
United States availed themselves of this opportunity by designat-
ing Section III of the document submitted by the Center for
56. See id., at *3, 15.
57. Id., at *7, 1 27.
58. For the text of Article XX, IN (b) and (g) see infra note 74. These are the main
environmental exceptions in GATT.
59. See Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *69, 155.
60. See id.
61. The Panel noted that under Article 13 of the DSU, the initiative to seek infor-
mation and to select the source of information rests with the Panel. See id.
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Marine Conservation and the Center for International Environ-
mental Law as an annex to its second submission to the Panel.62
The Panel first examined the complainant's claims regarding a viola-
tion of Article XI:I GATT 1994.63 Measures prohibited under Article
XI:1 include outright quotas and quantitative restrictions made effective
through import or export licenses. The Panel decided that the embargo
applied by the U.S. to the importation of shrimp and shrimp products
under Section 609 was identical to the prohibition considered in the Tuna
I and Tuna II Panel Reports. 64 In both cases, the Panels found that the re-
striction was a violation of Article XI. 65 Furthermore, the Panel noted
that the U.S. "does not dispute that with respect to countries not certi-
fied, Section 609 amounts to a restriction on the importation of shrimp
within the meaning of Article XI:l of GATT 1994. ' ' 66 The Panel consid-
ered that the evidence made available was sufficient to determine that the
U.S. prohibition of shrimp imports from non-certified members violated
Article XI: 1.67
The complainants further claimed that the U.S. import prohibition
violated Articles 1:168 and XIII:I. The complainants argued that identical
shrimp and shrimp products from different WTO Members was being
treated differently by the U.S. 69 Shrimp harvested by use of TEDs were
forbidden entry into the United States if harvested by a national of a
62. Id.
63. The full text of Article XI:1 of GATT 1994 states:Article XI - General Elimina-
tion of Quantitative Restrictions 1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes
or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or
other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importa-
tion of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or
sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party. See
supra note 6, art. XI:1.
64. See Tuna I and Tuna H Panel Reports, supra note 7.
65. See id.
66. Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *282, 13.
67. See id., at *283, 16.
68. The full text of Article 1:1 of GAT[ states:Article I General Most-Favoured-
Nation Treatment 1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on
or in connection with importation and exportation or imposed on the international transfer
of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties
and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation
and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Arti-
cle III, and advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to
any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immedi-
ately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories
of all other contracting parties. See supra note 6.
69. See Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *284, 18.
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non-certified country, but would be permitted to enter the U.S. if har-
vested by the same methods by a national of a certified country. 70 Moreo-
ver, the complainants pointed out that initially affected countries were
given a phase-in period of three years, while newly affected members
were generally given only four months notice to adopt a program which
complied with U.S. requirements. 71 Due to the conclusions reached con-
cerning violation under Article XI:1, the Panel found it unnecessary to
review violations72 under Article 1:1 and Article XIII:1 of GATT 1994.73
The Panel moved to address the U.S. defense under Article XX 74 of
GATT 1994. The complainants argued that Article XX(b) and (g) cannot
be invoked to justify a measure which applies to animals not within the
jurisdiction of the member enacting the measure. 75 The U.S. responded
that Article XX(b) and (g) contain no jurisdictional limitations. 76 In con-
sidering the arguments of the parties, the Panel had to look at "whether
Article XX(b) and (g) apply at all when a Member has taken a measure
conditioning access to its market for a given product on the adoption of
certain conservation policies by the exporting Member(s)." ' 77 In the
United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline78
[hereinafter "Reformulated Gasoline"], the Appellate Body stated that
70. See id.
71. See id., at *284, 19.
72. The WTO Appellate Body on U.S. - Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts and Blouses from India [hereinafter "Wool Shirts"] mentioned that "[a] panel need
only address those claims which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue
in the dispute." WTO Appellate Body Report on Wool Shirts, WTO Doc. WT/DS33/AB/
R (Apr. 25, 1997) (visited Mar. 25, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm>,
also available in 1997 WL 222239 (WTO) at *13.
73. See Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *285, 23.
74. The Preamble and relevant parts of Article XX on general exceptions include:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner that
would constitute a means arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, noth-
ing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; ...
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or con-
sumption; .... See supra note 6, art. XX.
75. See Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *285, 24.
76. See id.
77. Id., at *286, 26.
78. WTO Appellate Body Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) (visited Mar. 25,
1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm>, also available in 1996 WL 227476
(W.T.O.), 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996) [hereinafter "Reformulated Gasoline"].
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"WTO Members have a large measure of autonomy to determine their
own policies on the environment (including its relationship with trade),
their environmental objectives and the environmental legislation they en-
act and implement. So far as concerns the WTO, that autonomy is cir-
cumscribed only by the need to respect the requirements of the General
Agreement and the other covered agreements.
79
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(1969) [hereinafter the "Vienna Convention"] provides that "A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary mean-
ing to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its objective purpose." The Panel reasoned that the terms of the treaty
must be viewed not only in their ordinary meaning, but also in terms of
the context and the object and purpose of GATT 1994 and the WTO
agreement.80 In the Reformulated Gasoline case, the Appellate Body
stated that in order for Article XX to be used to justify a measure it must
fall under one of the measures listed in paragraphs (a) to (j) under Arti-
cle XX and it must also then satisfy the requirements of the opening par-
agraph or chapeau of Article XX.81 The Panel on United States Imports
of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies82 [hereinafter "Auto Spring As-
semblies"] specified that "the Preamble of Article XX made it clear that
it was the application of the measure and not the measure itself that
needed to be examined." 3 In attempting to define "unjustifiable" under
Article XX, the Panel reached the conclusion that the context of the cha-
peau of Article XX cannot be distinguished from that of Article XX as a
whole. s4
79. Id. at *30.
80. See Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *286, 27.
81. See Appellate Body Report on Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 78, at *22.
The Preamble to Article XX states: Subject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner that would constitute a means arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade, nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or en-
forcement by any contracting party of measures. See supra notes 6 and 74.
82. GATT Panel Report on United States - Imports of Certain Automotive Spring
Assemblies, WTO Doc. L/5333 (June 12 1982) (visited Mar. 25, 1999) <http://
www.wto.org/wto/dispute/panel.htm>, also available in 1982 WL 204029 (GATT) [herein-
after "Auto Spring Assemblies"].
83. Id., 56.
84. The Auto Spring Assemblies Panel looked to Article 31(2) of the Vienna Con-
vention which provides that the context for the purpose of treaty interpretation comprises
the text of the agreement, including its preamble and annexes. See Shrimp Imports Panel
Report, supra note 8, at *288, 35. The text of the Preamble to Article XX requires that
the measure not be applied in an unjustified discriminatory manner. See supra notes 6
and 74.
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The practice of past Panels has been to interpret Article XX as a
limited and narrow exception." Any measure falling within these excep-
tions must give consideration to the legal duties of the party claiming the
exception and the legal rights of the other parties concerned. 86 Thus,
while the WTO Preamble "confirms that environmental considerations
are important for the interpretation of the WTO Agreement, the central
focus of that agreement remains the promotion of economic development
through trade."' 87 The GATT Agreement is committed to a multilateral
trading system.88 The panel pointed to the decision in 1994 in Tuna H
where a similar issue was considered:
If Article XX were interpreted to permit contracting parties to de-
viate from the obligations of the General Agreement by taking
trade measures to implement policies, including conservation pol-
icies, within their own jurisdiction, the basic objectives of the
General Agreement would be maintained. If however Article XX
were interpreted to permit contracting to take trade measures so
as to force other contracting parties to change their policies
within their jurisdiction, including their conservation policies, the
balance of rights and obligations among contracting parties, in
particular the right of access to markets, would be seriously im-
paired. Under such an interpretation the General Agreement could
no longer serve as a multilateral framework for trade among con-
tracting parties.89
The United States argued that the Panel should have considered the
many examples of import bans under various international agreements
85. For the full discussion of a limited interpretation of Article XX see Shrimp Im-
ports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *288, 36-39. See also Tuna I Panel Report, supra
note 7, 5.20; and GAIT Panel Report on Canada - Administration of the Foreign In-
vestment Review Act, WTO Doc. L/5504 (July 25, 1983) (visited Mar. 25, 1999) <http://
www.wto.org/wto/dispute/panel.htm>, also available in 1983 WL 197514 (G.A.T.T.),
5.20 [hereinafter "Investment Review Act"].
86. See Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *289, 39.
87. Id., at *290, T 42.
88. See id., at *291, 43-45 and n.647.
89. Tuna H Panel Report, supra note 6, 5.26. Even though Tuna II was not
adopted, the findings of the Appellate Body in its report on Japan Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages stated that unadopted panel reports have no legal status in the GATT or WTO
system but a Panel can nevertheless find useful guidance in the reasoning of an
unadopted panel report that it considers to be relevant. See WTO Appellate Body Report
on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doe. WT/DS8/AB/R (July 11, 1996)
(visited Mar. 25, 1999) <http:llwww.wto.orglwto/dispute/distab.htm>, also available in
1996 WL 910779 (WTO) [hereinafter "Alcoholic Beverages"].
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that show that members may take actions to protect animals, whether
they are located within or without their jurisdiction.90 However, the Panel
countered that GATT Agreements and multilateral environmental agree-
ments (MEAs) are representative of efforts in the international commu-
nity to pursue shared goals, with the intention of developing mutually
supportive relationships between members with due respect afforded to
all.9' The U.S. pointed out that the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development [hereinafter "Rio Declaration"] recognized the right of
States to design their own environmental policies on the basis of their
own particular environmental and developmental situations. 92 The Panel
noted that the Rio Declaration also stressed the need for international
cooperation. 93
Section 609 contained provisions calling for the U.S. Secretary of
State to initiate negotiations for the development of bilateral or multilat-
eral agreements for the protection and conservation of sea turtles. 94 How-
ever, no evidence was presented to show that the U.S. actually undertook
negotiations on an agreement with the complainants concerning for sea
turtle conservation before the imposition of the import prohibition or-
dered by the U.S. CIT.95 Even though the deadline for the imposition of
import was May, 1, 1996, the U.S. did not propose negotiation of an
agreement to any of the complainants until September 1996, after the
conclusion of negotiations on the Inter American Convention for the Pro-
tection and Conservation of Sea Turtles. 96
90. See Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *293, 50.
91. See id., at *293, 50, n.657.
92. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, The Final Text of
Agreements Negotiated by Governments at the United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development (UNCED), Principle 2, June 3-14, 1992, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
(stating that "environmental measures addressing transboundary or global environmental
problems should, as far as possible, be based in international consensus").
93. See id.
94. See Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *296, 56.
95. See id. The Panel noted that this was similar to the situation considered in the
Gasoline case when the Appellate Body noted that the U.S. had not even pursued the
possibility of entering cooperative arrangements which would have alleviated the discrim-
ination suffered by foreign refiners. In the Reformulated Gasoline case, the Appellate
Body concluded that the measure was "unjustifiable discrimination" and a "disguised re-
striction on international trade." See Appellate Body Report on Reformulated Gasoline,
see supra note 78, at *17.
96. Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles,
Sept. 5, 1996. The United States did not propose any negotiations with the complainants
until after the deadline for the implementation of the import ban on May 1, 1996. Even
then the efforts made consisted merely of an exchange of documents. See Shrimp Imports
Panel Report, supra note 8, at *296, 56.
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Concerning international obligations regarding the protection of sea
turtles, both parties referred to the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES"). 97 All turtle
species covered in this dispute are listed under Appendix I of CITES,
covering species threatened with extinction.98 However, the subject of the
import prohibition was shrimp, which was not an endangered species.99
Therefore, the Panel found CITES could not be considered to impose on
its members specific methods for catching, such as TEDs. °° In conclu-
sion the Panel stated, We consider that the United States adopted mea-
sures which, irrespective of their environmental purpose, were clearly a
threat to the multilateral trading system and were applied without any se-
rious attempt to reach, beforehand, a negotiated solution. We therefore
find that the U.S. measure at issue is not within the scope of measures
permitted under the chapeau of Article XX.1
B. Appellate Body Report
On July 13, 1998, the U.S. notified the Dispute Settlement Body of
its intention to appeal certain *issues of law and certain interpretations de-
veloped by the Panel in its April 1998, decision. 1°2 The U.S. claimed that
the Panel erred in disallowing acceptance of unsolicited submissions from
NGOs.103 According to the U.S., Article 13.2 of the DSU gave the Panel
the discretionary authority to choose the sources of its information. The
U.S. also argued that Section 609 was within the scope of Article XX
and did not constitute "unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail."1°4 Furthermore, the U.S. claimed that
the Panel's interpretation that Section 609 was a "threat to the multilat-
eral trading system" was not mentioned in the text of GATT and had
never been adopted by any previous Panel or Appellate Body Report.105
Inquiry into effects on the trading system was uncalled for, and would
add "an entirely new obligation under Article XX of GAIT 1994."' 1 6
97. See Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *297, 58.
98. All marine turtles were listed on March 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, 12 I.L.M.
1985 (1973).
99. See Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *297, 58.
100. See id.
101. Id., at *298, 61-62.
102. This document, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/l1, dated July 13, 1998 is available in
Westlaw at 1998 WL 394607 (WTO).
103. See Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 1 8.
104. Id., 10.
105. See id.
106. Id., 1 13.
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The issues to be addressed by the Appellate Body were:(a) whether
the panel erred in finding that accepting non-requested information from
nongovernmental sources would be incompatible with the provisions of
the DSU as currently applied; and (b) whether the panel erred in finding
that the measure at issue constitutes unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail and thus is not within the
scope of measures permitted under Article XX of GATT 1994.107
C. Dispute Resolution Under GAIT
In the 1947 GATT agreement, the dispute settlement provision was
Article XXIII.10 8 Unfortunately, the panel process still contained two
weaknesses. First, panel reports could only be adopted by consensus.1°9
Second, the legal significance of panel reports was unclear.I" 0 At the Uru-
guay Round, the Punta del Este Declaration provided that "in order to
ensure prompt and effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all
contracting parties, negotiations shall aim to improve and strengthen the
rules and the procedures of the dispute settlement process." '  The new
WTO established after the Uruguay Round provided for a new dispute
resolution process.112 Several important aspects of this process include:
(1) the establishment of an Appellate Body;'" 3 (2) adoption of panel and
appellate reports may be blocked by consensus only;' 14 and (3) the losing
party risks the implementation of trade sanctions if it does not implement
the panel or appellate report within a reasonable time. 115
107. Id., 1 98.
108. See GATT, supra note 6, art. XXIII. For further discussion see also JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 94 (1989); OLIVER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILAT-
ERAL TRADE SYSTEM 73 (1987); and David M. Schwartz, WTO Dispute Resolution
Panels: Failing to Protect Against Conflicts of Interest, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
955, 958 (1995).
109. GATT members traditionally interpreted "consensus only" to mean that there
could be no significant dissent concerning the panels report or it could not be adopted.
See generally JoHN H. JACKSON, The Legal Meaning of GATT Dispute Settlement Report:
Some Reflections, in 1 TOWARDS MORE EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION BY INTERNATIONAL ORGA-
NIZATIONS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HENRY G. SCHERMERS 149, 154 (Niels Blokker, et al
eds., 1994).
110. See generally id. at 156-60.
111. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, Sept. 20, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1623 (1986).
112. See DSU, supra note 48.
113. See id., art. 17.
114. See id., arts. 16.4 and 17.14.
115. See id., art. 22.1.
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III. SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S REASONING
The Appellate Body noted that under Article 13 of the DSU, the ini-
tiative to seek information and to select the source of information rests
with the panel. 1 6 Access to the dispute settlement process is limited to
WTO Members.' 17 Even then, only WTO Members who have given no-
tice of their interest in the dispute have a legal right to make submissions
to the Panel.
The Appellate Body found that the Shrimp Imports Panel was within
its discretionary authority under Articles 11 and 13 of the DSU in decid-
ing not to seek information.118 The Appellate Body noted:It is particularly
within the province and the authority of a panel to determine the need
for information and advice in a specific case, to ascertain the acceptabil-
ity and relevancy of information or advice received, and to decide what
weight to ascribe to that information or advice or to conclude that no
weight at all should be given to what has been received." 9
However, the Panel mistakenly equated "authority to seek informa-
tion" with a prohibition on accepting information which had been sub-
mitted without being requested by a panel. 20 A Panel has the discretion-
ary authority to accept or reject information and advice whether or not
the information was requested by the Panel.' 2' Therefore, the Appellate
Body held that the Panel "erred in its legal interpretation that accepting
116. Article 13 of the DSU states: 1) Each panel shall have the right to seek infor-
mation and technical advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate.
However, before a panel seeks such information or advice from any individual or body
within the jurisdiction of a Member, it shall inform the authorities of that Member. A
Member should respond promptly and fully to any request by a panel for such informa-
tion as the panel considers necessary and appropriate. Confidential information which is
provided shall not be revealed without formal authorization from the individual, body, or
authorities of the Member providing that information. 2) Panels seek information from
any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of
the matter. With respect to a factual issue concerning a scientific or other technical matter
raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may request an advisory report in writing from an
expert review group. Rules for the establishment of such a group are and its procedures
are set forth in Appendix 4. See DSU, supra note 48.
117. See Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 1 101.
118. See id., 9N 101-108.
119. Id., 1 104 (emphasis omitted). The Appellate Body noted further that "Under
articles 12 and 13, taken together, the DSU accords to a Panel established by the DSB,
and engaged in a dispute settlement proceeding, ample and extensive authority to under-
take and control the process by which it informs itself of the relevant facts of the dispute
and of the legal norms and principles applicable to such facts." Id., T 106. See supra note
116 for the text of Article 13 of the DSU.
120. See Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 108.
121. See id.
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non-requested information from non-governmental sources is incompati-
ble with the provisions of the DSU." 122
The second issue the Shrimp Imports Appellate Body confronted
was whether the Panel erred in finding that Section 609 of the 1996
Guidelines constituted unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevailed. According to the Appellate Body,
the Panel did not follow all steps of the customary rules of interpretation
of public international law as set forth by Article 3.2 of the DSU.' 23 Not-
ing previous Appellate Body decisions concerning treaty interpretation, 124
the Appellate Body stated that the Article 3.2 of the DSU had been inter-
preted to call for: [A]n examination of the ordinary meaning of the
words of a treaty, read in their context, and in the light of the object and
purpose of the treaty involved. A treaty interpreter must begin with, and
focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in
the words constituting that provision read in their context, that the object
and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where
the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or
where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is
desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may
usefully be sought. 25
In the present case, the Panel focused repeatedly on the design of
the measure as opposed to focusing on the manner in which that measure
122. Id., T 110.
123. See id., 114.
124. See e.g., Appellate Body Report on Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 78, at
*17; Appellate Body Report on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 89, at 10-12; WTO Ap-
pellate Body Report on India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997), available in 1997 WL
804929 (WTO), TT 45-46 [hereinafter "India Patent Protection"]; WTO Appellate Body
Report on Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and
Other Items, WTO Doc. WT/DS56/AB/R (March 27, 1998) (visited May 22, 1999)
<http://www/wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm>, also available in 1998 WL 175346 (WTO),
T 47 [hereinafter "Argentina Footwear"]; and WTO Appellate Body Report on European
Communities - Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, WTO Doc. WT/
DS62/AB/R (June 5, 1998) (visited May 22, 1999) <http:/lwww/wto.org/wtoldispute/dis-
tab.htm>, also available in 1998 WL 295540 (WTO), 85 [hereinafter "EC Computer
Equipment"].
125. Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 114. The text of
Article 31, the general rule of interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties states, "A treaty shall be interpreted on good faith in accordance with the ordi-
nary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose." See also I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES, 2nd ed. (Manchester University Press, 1984), at 130-31.
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was applied. 126 The Panel's analysis was misguided because the Panel
"disregarded the sequence of steps essential for carrying out such an
analysis."' 127 In the Reformulated Gasoline case, the Appellate Body
stated that the proper method for extending the justifying protection of
Article XX included: 1) the measure at issue must come under one or an-
other of the particular exceptions, paragraphs (a) to (j) listed under Arti-
cle XX; and 2) the measure must also satisfy the opening clauses of Arti-
cle XX.128 The Shrimp Imports Panel suggested that the sequence to be
followed for this test did not matter. 29 The Appellate Body disagreed
with this conclusion. 30 The test, as formulated by the Panel, created a
broad standard and test which had no basis in the chapeau of Article XX
or either of the exceptions claimed by the United States.131 The Appellate
Body found that the Panel's interpretive analysis of this standard consti-
tuted legal error and therefore reversed the Panel's decision. 132 Under
mandates found in Article 17 of the DSU, the Appellate Body found, as
in previous cases, "In certain appeals, . . . the reversal of a panel's find-
ing on a legal issue may require us to make a finding on a legal issue
which was not addressed by the Panel."' 33
In Shrimp Imports, the U.S. primarily invoked Article XX(g), claim-
ing Article XX(b) only in the alternative. The Appellate Body held that,
"in line with the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation, 134
126. See Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 115.
127. Id., 1 117.
128. See Appellate Body Report on Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 78, at 22.
129. See Shrimp Imports Panel Report, supra note 8, at *286, 28.
130. See Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 119.
131. See id., 121.
132. See id., 122.
133. WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities - Measure Affecting
the Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS69/AB/R (July 13, 1998)
(visited May 22, 1999) <http://www/wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm>, also available in
1998 WL 388561 (WTO), 156 [hereinafter "Poultry Products"]. See also WTO Appel-
late Body Report on Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WTO Doc.
WT/DS31/AB/R (June 30, 1997) (visited May 22, 1999) <http://www/wto.org/wto/dis-
pute/distab.htm>, also available in 1997 WL 398913 (WTO) at 23-24 (hereinafter "Cana-
dian Periodicals"].
134. The Appellate Body referred to the following sources in its report: Appellate
Body on Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 78, at *25; Appellate Body Report on Alco-
holic Beverages, supra note 89, at *12; WTO Appellate Body Report on United States -
Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, WTO Doc. WT/
DS24/AB/R (Feb. 10, 1997) (visited May 22, 1999) <http://www/wto.org/wto/dispute/dis-
tab.htm>, also available in 1997 WL 426484 (WTO), at *16. See also Jennings and
Watts eds. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, 9"h ed., vol. 1 (Longman's, 9"' ed. 1992), at
1280-81; M.S. McDougal, H.D. Laswell and J. Miller. THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PROCEDURE
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measures to conserve exhaustible natural resources, 13 5 whether living or
non-living, may fall within Article XX(g)."1 36 The Appellate Body found
"sufficient nexus between the migratory and endangered marine popula-
tions involved and the United States for purposes of Article XX(g)."' 137
The Appellate Body further found that, as required under Article XX(g),
Section 609 was closely related to the purpose of conserving an exhaus-
tible natural resource. 31 Since the Appellate Body found that Section 609
came within the terms of Article XX(g), it was not necessary to analyze
the measure in terms of Article XX(b). 13 9
The Appellate Body then turned to the Preamble of Article XX to
see if Section 609 could be justified under the introductory clauses. 14°
The U.S. argued that "(i)f a measure differentiates between countries
based on a rationale legitimately connected with the policy of an Article
XX exception, rather than for protectionist reasons, the measure does not
amount to an abuse of the applicable Article XX exception." 141 The Ap-
pellate Body disagreed with this reasoning. 142 A measure which was
found to fall under the terms of Article XX(g) might not necessarily
comply with the requirements of the chapeau.
143
Three standards exist in the chapeau of Article XX: 1) arbitrary dis-
crimination between countries where the same conditions prevail; 2) un-
justifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail; and 3) a disguised restriction on international trade. 144 For the
first two standards, three elements are required: 1) the application of the
measure must result in discrimination; 2) the discrimination must be arbi-
trary or unjustifiable in character; and 3) this discrimination must occur
in countries where the same conditions prevail.14 5 The Preamble was de-
184 (1994); I. Sinclair, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 118
(Manchester Univ. Press, 2nd ed. 1984), 1984. For further sources see Appellate Body Re-
port on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 131, n.116.
135. None of the parties disputed the exhaustability of sea turtles. As the Appellate
Body stated, this would have been difficult to dispute since all seven of the recognized
species of sea turtles are listed in Appendix 1 of CITES. See Appellate Body Report on
Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 132; and CITES, Article I.1.
136. Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 131.
137. Id., 133.
138. For the Appellate Body's full discussion see Appellate Body Report on Shrimp
Imports, supra note 1, IN 135-42.
139. See id., 146.
140. For the text of the Preamble see supra note 74.
141. Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 148.
142. See id., 149.
143. See id.
144. Id., 150.
145. Id.
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signed to prevent the abuse of the Article XX exceptions. In the Refor-
mulated Gasoline case the Appellate Body stated, "the measures falling
within the particular exceptions must be applied reasonably, with due re-
gard both to the legal duties of the party claiming the exception and the
legal rights of the other parties concerned."'' 46 In the present case, the
Appellate Body stated, "a balance must be struck between the right of a
Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the duty of that
same Member to respect the treaty rights of the other Members. To per-
mit one Member to abuse or misuse its rights to invoke an exception
would be effectively to allow that Member to degrade its own treaty ob-
ligations as well as to devalue the treaty rights of other Members."'' 47
The exceptions listed under Article XX were "limited and conditional
exceptions from the substantive obligations contained in the other provi-
sions of the GATT 1994 .. .the ultimate availability of the exception is
subject to the compliance by the invoking member with the requirements
of the chapeau." 148 The Appellate Body referred to an application of the
general principle of "good faith" known as the doctrine of "abus de
droit." 149 This doctrine prohibited the abusive exercise of a state's rights
and stated that whenever the assertion of a right "impinges on the field
covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, that is to
say, reasonably." 150
The 1996 Guidelines required other WTO Members to adopt regula-
tory measures which were essentially the same as measures applied to
U.S. shrimp trawl vessels.' 51 As the Appellate Body stated, "it is not ac-
ceptable, in international trade relations, for one WTO Member to use an
economic embargo to require other members to adopt essentially the
same comprehensive regulatory program, to achieve a certain policy goal,
146. Appellate Body Report on Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 78, at *22.
147. Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 1 156.
148. Id., 1 157 (emphasis omitted).
149. See id., 158.
150. Id., 1 158. In footnote 156, the Appellate Body offers several sources for fur-
thering reading of the doctrine of "abus de droit." In particular, they cite B. CHENG, GEN-
ERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 125
(1953):" . . . a reasonable and bona fide exercise of a right in such a case is one which
is appropriate and necessary for the purpose of the right (i.e., in furtherance of the inter-
ests which the right is intended to protect). It should at the same time be fair and equita-
ble as between the parties and not one which is calculated to procure for one of them an
unfair advantage in the light of the obligation assumed. A reasonable exercise of the right
is regarded as compatible with the obligation. But the exercise of the right in such a
manner as to prejudice the interests of the other contracting party arising out of the treaty
is unreasonable and is considered as inconsistent with the bona fide execution of the
treaty obligation, and a breach of the treaty...."
151. See Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 163.
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as that in force within that Member's territory, without taking into con-
sideration different conditions which may occur in the territories of those
other Members.' ' 152 Furthermore, despite the U.S. Congress's recognition
of the importance of securing international agreement on the protection
and conservation of sea turtles under Section 609(a), 53 the record indi-
cated no serious efforts by the United States to attempt negotiations
before imposition of the import ban. 54 Moreover, the Appellate Body
found that the different "phase-in" periods for different countries, in par-
ticular the shorter three to four months given the parties to this case, re-
sulted in differences of treatment which were "unjustifiable discrimina-
tion" within the meaning of the Preanble of Article XX.
i55
None of the types of certification listed under Section 609(b)(2) had
a predictable certification process that was followed by U.S. officials.'
56
In its statement at the oral hearing, the U.S. admitted that:
. . . [T]here is no formal opportunity for an applicant country to
be heard, or to respond to any arguments that may be made
against it, in the course of the certification process before a deci-
sion to grant or to deny certification is made. Moreover, no for-
mal written, reasoned decision, whether of acceptance or rejec-
tion, is rendered on applications for either type of certification,
whether under Section 609(b)(2)(A) and (B) or under Section
609(b)(2)(C). Countries which are granted certification are in-
cluded in a list of approved applications published in the Federal
Register; however, they are not notified specifically. Countries
whose applications are denied also do not receive notice of such
denial (other than by omission form the list of approved applica-
tions) or of the reasons for the denial. No procedure for review
of, or appeal from, a denial of an application is provided. 57
The Appellate Body concluded that the Section 609, while qualifying for
provisional justification under Article XX(g), failed to meet the require-
ments of the chapeau of Article XX and thus could not be justified under
Article XX of GATT 1994.158
152. Id., 1 164 (emphasis omitted).
153. See 1996 Guidelines, supra note 28.
154. See Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 166.
155. See id., 176.
156. For further discussion of the administrative process of certification see id.,
177-84.
157. Id., 1 180 (footnote omitted).
158. See id., 9N 184, 187.
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To clarify the implications of its decision, the Appellate Body noted
that their decision did not decide that the protection and preservation of
the environment is of no significance to WTO Members. 5 9 The Appellate
Body stated: "We have not decided that the sovereign nations that are
Members of the WTO cannot adopt effective measures to protect endan-
gered species, such as sea turtles. Clearly, they can and they should. And
we have not decided that sovereign states should not act together bilater-
ally, plurilaterally or multilaterally, either within the WTO or in other in-
ternational fora, to protect endangered species or to otherwise protect the
environment. Clearly, they should and do. . . . although the measure of
the United States in dispute in this appeal serves an environmental objec-
tive that is recognized as legitimate under paragraph (g) of Article XX of
the GATT 1994, this measure has been applied by the United States in a
manner which constitutes arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination be-
tween Members of the WTO, contrary to the requirements of the chapeau
of Article XX." 60
IV. ANALYSIS
The announcement of the WTO Appellate Body's decision in
Shrimp Imports drew angry comments from many U.S. environmentalist
groups. The conflict over environmental protection and liberalized trade
is not a new topic of contention. 161 While academians, governmental offi-
cials and policy makers tend to take sides for either liberalized trade or
environmental protection, it could be argued that both liberalized trade
and environmental protective measures are beneficial for human kind.
However, to gain the benefits of both liberalized trade and environmental
protection, these two types of policies/principles must be applied in rec-
ognition of their mutual ties and benefits to the common good. Just as
159. See id., 185.
160. Id., 185-86.
161. For a general overview of the argument for liberalized trade see for example
DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLmCAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 81 (1817); JOHN
H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECO-
NOMIC RELATIONS 8-17 (1989); Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade and the Environment: The False
Conflict , in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLICY (Durwood
Zaelke, et al., eds. 1993). For an overview of the argument against liberalized trade and
for environmental protection see generally Richard Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Com-
petition, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210; Steve Charnowitz, The Environment vs. Trade Rules:
Defogging the Debate, 23 Envt'l L. 475, 476-77 (1993); HERMAN E. DALY, Problems
with Free Trade: Neoclassical and Steady-State Perspectives, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT: LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLICY 147-52, 155-57 (1993); Daniel Esty and Damien
Geradin, Market Access, Competitiveness, and Harmonization: Environmental Protection
in Regional Trade Agreements, 21 HARV. ENV. L. REV. 265 (1997).
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trade policies should not be enacted without first considering environ-
mental consequences, environmental policies should not be enacted with-
out at least considering the consequences on trade policies of other coun-
tries. The recent Shrimp Imports decision offers another prime example
of the failure of the U.S. to see the bigger picture.
A. The Acceptance of Amicus Briefs
The Earth Island Institute was quick to condemn the Appellate
Body's decision. 162 Critics, however, have failed to notice what may turn
out to be a most beneficial step forward in future dispute resolutions.
The Appellate Body found accepting non-requested information from
non-governmental sources compatible with Article 13163 of the DSU.
64
This marked a significant step toward an increased role for interest
groups in future dispute resolutions. In a day and age when developing
countries are still struggling with feeding their citizens and promoting ec-
onomic development, this may give NGOs and other interest groups the
perfect role for assuring that environmental interests are not forgotten in
trade agreements. During the 50 th anniversary meeting of GATT in Ge-
neva in May of 1998, President Clinton "called for the admissibility of
such briefs to encourage greater transparency and accountability" within
GATT.165
No formal rules currently exist for submission of amicus briefs by
NGOs. No Panel has ever permitted direct submission of amicus briefs.
Until now, NGOs have had to persuade a WTO Member to include its
arguments in the member's submission in a dispute. That member had
the choice of not adopting all of the NGO's arguments. In the Shrimp
Imports dispute, the U.S. asked the Appellate Body to simply consider
the expert opinions in the briefs. Such precedent could eventually lead to
groups such as NGOs, commercial interest groups, corporations, etc. ag-
gressively pressuring the U.S., or other members, to allow submission of
their amicus briefs. While the Shrimp Imports Appellate Body implied
that the Panel did not have to consider anything in the brief that was not
expressly adopted by the WTO Member, it also opened the door to allow
interest groups to submit amicus briefs directly to the WTO panel. Of
course, the Panel accepts the amicus brief at its own discretion. The main
issue still left was whether the WTO panel would be required to consider
162. See Earth Island Institute's website at <http://www.earthisland.org> (visited Jan.
5, 1999).
163. For the text of Article 13 of the DSU see supra note 116.
164. See Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, T 110.
165. James Cameron and Stephen J. Orava, WTO Opens Disputes to Private Voices,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 7, 1998, at B5, available in Lexis (visited Jan. 22, 1999).
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facts and legal arguments which had not first been approved by a WTO
Member. This may need to be clarified through rule making since no for-
mal rules currently exist for this type of situation. Another concern is the
possible bombardment of WTO panelists by lobbyists of strong interest
groups.166 These problems could also possibly be addressed in a formal
rule. While the Appellate Body's decision opened the door to future use
of amicus briefs, it also left the Panel with discretionary authority to ac-
cept or reject information and advice. 167 The Appellate Body did not rule
against the Panel's decision to not accept submissions if they were not
directly solicited by the Panel, but rather found that the Panel's interpre-
tation of "seek" was excessively formal. 168 The Panel should not have
166. Some restraints will undoubtedly be required if WTO Panels begin to freely ac-
cept amicus briefs from interest groups. An NGO which has pursued the strictest enforce-
ment of Section 609 is the Earth Island Institute. On September 17, 1998, a coalition of
environmental groups including, the Sea Turtle Restoration Project of Earth Island Insti-
tute, the Sierra Club, and the Humane Society of the U.S., filed for a temporary re-
straining order in the U.S. Court of International Trade, asking for the enforcement of
Section 609 and the withdrawal of weaker U.S. guidelines published after the initial panel
report in the Shrimp Imports dispute. These weaker guidelines call for the use of a ship-
ment by shipment standard for certification as opposed to the nation by nation standard
issued in the 1996 guidelines. An excerpt of Public Notice 2876, published in the Federal
Register and effective as of August 28, 1998, can be found at the Earth Island Institute's
website for its Sea Turtle Restoration Project at <http://www.earthisland.org/strp/
shipguidelines.html> (visited Jan. 5, 1999).
Earth Island offers an extensive website on its fight to save sea turtles. Such a dedi-
cated fight is admirable since it is for a good cause, but also seemed to be one-sided
while operating at full speed with blinkers to avoid seeing any side issues. The general
address for the website is <http://www.earthisland.org>.
167. See Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, T 108.
168. See id., 9 107-108. The Appellate Body noted that the Shrimp Imports Panel
did two things in determining to not accept the unsolicited submission of amicus briefs,
"[flirst, the Panel declared a legal interpretation of certain provisions of the DSU: i.e.,
that excepting non-requested information from non-governmental sources would be, 'in-
compatible with the provisions of the DSU as currently applied.' Evidently as a result of
this legal interpretation, the Panel announced that it would not take the briefs submitted
by non-governmental organizations into consideration. Second the Panel nevertheless al-
lowed any party to the dispute to put forward the briefs, or any part thereof, as part of its
own submissions to the Panel, giving the other party or parties . . . two additional weeks
to respond to the additional material." Id., 91 100. The Panel dwelled on the fact that the
only parties who have a legal right to make submissions to a WTO Panel are the parties
to the dispute who must be WTO Members or WTO Members who have a substantial in-
terest in the suit. See id., 101. The Appellate Body determined that it was more appro-
priate to address this issue by examining what a Panel was authorized to do under the
DSU. See id. In particular, Article 13 of the DSU governs the right to seek information.
See supra note 114. Two recent Appellate Body decisions adopted right before the
Panel's ruling in the Shrimp Imports dispute interpreted Article 13. In EC Measures Af-
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rejected the amicus briefs because they were unsolicited. Rather, they
could reject the amicus briefs because they had the discretionary power
to do so. 169 The Appellate Body stated, "A panel has the discretionary
authority either to accept and consider or to reject information and advice
submitted to it, whether requested by a panel or not."170 The initial fear
was that this ruling would lead to a barrage of amicus briefs from NGOs.
Understandably so, it would be counterproductive to permit too many in-
terested parties to submit amicus briefs. For that reason, the Appellate
Body did not grant an absolute right to submit amicus briefs directly to
the WTO Panel.
Nonetheless, this was at least recognition that amicus briefs could be
accepted at the discretion of a dispute panel. Setting some limits on ami-
cus brief submissions was the wiser choice. NGOs may offer the best op-
portunity to promote environmental interests, but more prominent and
forceful NGOs may also tend to have extreme views which may not nec-
essarily be representative of the best interests of global sustainable con-
servation. A perfect example is the Sea Turtle Restoration Project
("STRP") at Earth Island Institute17' which might be considered the most
vocal U.S. advocate for sea turtle conservation. While their motives are
good, their strategies are less desirable. One of STRP's responses to the
Shrimp Imports Appellate Body decision was a call for supporters to
fecting Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), the Appellate Body observed that Article
13 "enable[s] panels to seek information and advice. as they deem appropriate in a partic-
ular case," and that the DSU leaves "to the sound discretion of a panel the determination
of whether the establishment of an expert review group is necessary or appropriate."
WTO Appellate Body Report on EC - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (visited Mar. 25, 1999) <http://
www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm>, also available in 1998 WL 25520 (WTO), 147
[hereinafter "Meat Products"]. In Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear,
Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, the Appellate Body ruled that "[p]ursuant to Article
13.2 of the DSU, a panel may seek information from any relevant source and may con-
sult experts to obtain their opinions on certain aspects of the matter at issue. This is a
grant of discretionary authority: a panel is not duty-bound to seek information in each
and every case or to consult particular experts under this provision .... Just as a panel
has the discretion to determine how to seek expert advice, so also does a panel have the
discretion to determine whether to seek information or expert advice at all." Appellate
Body Report on Argentina Footwear, supra note 124, 84-86.Article 12.1 of the DSU
authorizes panels to follow or change the working procedures set forth in the Appendix 3
of the DSU, and to develop their own working procedures after consultation with parties
to the dispute. See Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 105.
169. See Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 108.
170. Id. (emphasis in text).
171. For more information on STRP and Earth Island Institute, an extensiye website
is located at <http://www.earthisland.org> (visited Jan. 5, 1999).
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write U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky,1 72 and President
Clinton, urging them "to get the U.S. out of WTO."' 173 Isolationism is
definitely not a solution. Plans for saving the environment must be glob-
ally oriented and must consider the effects of those plans on all involved
parties.
B. Interpreting Article XX 17 4 of GATT: The Environmental
Exceptions
The GATT does not govern trade but rather governs trade restric-
tions in an attempt to globally liberalize trade. The majority of disputes
that arise under GATT fall under the most-favored-nation (Article I), na-
tional treatment (Article III), and quantitative restriction (Article IX)
standards found in GATT. A complaining state must convince a WTO
Panel that a trade measure is discriminatory. Once a violation has been
demonstrated, the responding party has the burden of proving that its ac-
tions do not violate GATT or can be found as an exception under another
provision of GATT, such as Article XX. Article XX provides exceptions
for members who can prove that the trade restriction was necessary for
some overriding policy concern. While Article XX exceptions are com-
monly used, only one decision has come close to upholding an environ-
mental law. 175 However, the recent Shrimp Import decision provided fur-
ther direction as to what might pass approval under these environmental
exceptions. Coupled with Reformulated Gasoline, the Shrimp Imports de-
cision has clearly established for future panels the proper procedure to
follow when applying Article XX to environmental trade measures.
Conflicts generally arise when a state with more stringent environ-
mental standards enacts one of two types of trade measures. The first
type are trade measures with trade restrictions designed to regulate the
environmental quality within the territory of the high-level state.176 The
second type are trade measures which attempt to persuade another coun-
try to change policies within its own territory. 177 When reviewing an en-
vironmental trade measure ("ETM"), GATT reviews, not the effective-
ness of the ETM, but rather how well the ETM accomplishes its
172. See <http://www.earthisland.org/strp/wto.html> (visited Jan. 5, 1999).
173. See <http://www.earthisland.org/strp/wtointlaw.html> (visited Jan. 5, 1999).
174. For the full text of Article XX of GATT see supra note 74.
175. See Auto Taxes Panel Report, supra note 4.
176. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER AND ROBERT E. HUDEC, GATT Legal Re-
straints on Domestic Environmental Regulations, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION
59 (1996).
177. See id.
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purpose.'7 8 Critics of GATT argue that an ETM can only be effective if it
has at least some elements of severity.179 One uncertain area under Arti-
cle XX is extraterritoriality. 10 Can imports be restricted for differences in
environmental policies across countries?
i. Article XX(b)
In the Shrimp Import decision, the U.S. only claimed Article XX(b)
as an alternative exception in case Section 609 was found to not fall
under Article XX(g). Since the Appellate Body found that Section 609
fell under Article XX(g), the Appellate Body did not review the U.S. ar-
gument for Article XX(b). 181 However, a general understanding of Article
XX(b) is appropriate in reviewing the environmental exceptions. The two
critical questions raised under Article XX(b) are: 1) what constitutes a
"necessary" measure to protect human, animal, or plant life; and 2)
where must these humans, animals, and plants be located? The panel de-
cision in Thailand - Restrictions on the Importation of and Internal Taxes
on Cigarettes'82 concluded that a trade restriction is only "necessary" if
no other reasonably available measure exists, and that the alternative
measure would not be less violative than the original measure. 83 Moreo-
ver, even if the measures available are equal in degree if severity, a
WTO Member must use the measure which entails the least degree of in-
consistency with GATT provisions. 8 4 In Tuna II, in a dispute over
dolphin conservation involving essentially the same issues as the Shrimp
Imports case, the panel ruled that an embargo could not protect the life
or health of dolphins. 8 5 Furthermore, as a matter of policy, Article
178. See GATT, supra note 6, art. XX.
179. For general discussions on this issue see Mark Edward Foster, Note, Trade and
Environment: Making Room for Environmental Trade Measures Within the GATT, 71 S.
CAL. L. REV. 393 (1998).
180. See generally Piritta Sorsa, GAYT and the Environment: Basic Issues and Some
Developing Country Concerns, in WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS: INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 309-10 (1992).
181. See Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 131.
182. GATF Panel Report on Thailand - Restrictions on the Importation of and Inter-
nal Taxes on Cigarettes, WTO Doc. WT/DSI0/R (Oct. 5, 1990) (visited May 22, 1999)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/panel.htm>, also available in 1990 WL 692205 (GATT)
[hereinafter "Thailand Cigarettes"].
183. See id., 74. See also Tuna II Panel Report, supra note 7, 5.39; and Appel-
late Body Report on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 89.
184. See GATT Panel Report on United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, WTO Doc. L/6439 (Nov. 7 1989) (visited May 22, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/
dispute/distab.htm>, also available in 1989 WL 587604 (GATT), 5.26 [hereinafter
"Tariff Act"].
185. See Tuna 11 Panel, supra note 7, 5.35 (limiting importing nation regulation to
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XX(b) could not be interpreted to allow one member nation to force a
change in the policies of another member nation.1 86
ii. Article XX(g)
For a trade measure to be accepted under Article XX(g), the mea-
sure must be related to the conservation of an "exhaustible natural re-
source" and be taken "in conjunction with restrictions on domestic pro-
duction or consumption."1 87 Steve Charnowitz has suggested that the
term "exhaustible natural resources" may have been limited to nonre-
newable raw materials.188 After an overview of treaty interpretation, the
Shrimp Imports Appellate Body found "measures to conserve exhaustible
natural resources, whether living or non-living, may fall within Article
XX(g)." 1189
The Appellate Body's decision in Reformulated Gasoline gave the
first detailed clarification of how to interpret Article XX.19° In that report,
the Appellate Body noted that the Panel in Reformulated Gasoline mis-
takenly inquired as to whether the discriminatory treatment afforded by
the measure was simply "related to" conservation.1 91 Rather, the true in-
quiry should be whether the measure itself was "primarily aimed at" the
conservation of a natural resource.1 92 This in essence softens the require-
ments associated with Article XX(g). This classification had actually also
been made previously in Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Un-
processed Herring and Salmon.193 In Shrimp Imports, the Appellate Body
found that the same mistakes in interpretation had been made by the
Shrimp Imports Panel. 194 Partial blame should be placed on dispute panel
members who are not elected officials and whose knowledge of past dis-
pute resolutions may be sketchy. How familiar do these panelists have to
regulation as products).
186. See id., 5.38.
187. See GATT, supra note 6, art. XX(g). The full text of Article XX(g) can be
found at supra note 74.
188. For a review of the history of the environmental exceptions see Charnovitz,
supra note 4; and Steve Charnovitz, Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GATT Rules and Their
Application to Environmental Trade Measures, 7 TUL. ENVT'L L.J. 299 (1994).
189. Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 131.
190. See Appellate Body on Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 78.
191. See id., at *9-*13.
192. See id. See also GATT Panel Report on Canada - Measures Affecting Exports
of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, WTO Doc. L16268 (Nov. 20, 1987) (visited May
22, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/panel.htm>, also available in 1987 WL
421961 (GATT), IT 4.5-4.7.
193. See id., 4.6.
194. See Appellate Body Report on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 1 115.
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be before they are permitted to preside over a dispute resolution? Deci-
sions like Reformulated Gasoline and Shrimp Imports have at least estab-
lished a more transparent, predictable dispute resolution process under
the GATT.
The Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body also overruled the lan-
guage of previous panels that required that a measure not only "reflect a
conservation purpose," but also "some positive conservation effect," by
reasoning that it might take years before the effects of a measure could
truly be observed.'95 These clarifications by the Appellate Body in Refor-
mulated Gasoline had the effect of broadening the scope of measures that
could possibly be considered under the Article XX exceptions.
Another major fault with Section 609 was the fact that the shrimp
were banned due to the process by which they were caught. 96 In Tuna I,
the Panel noted that an importing country may distinguish between actual
products, but it may not distinguish between imported products not pro-
duced in conformity with the importing country's domestic policies from
products which are produced in conformity with the importing country's
domestic policies. 197 This identical issue raised in Tuna I, Tuna I and
Shrimp Imports Panel decisions, concerned the "primarily aimed at" test
under the notion that a prohibition would not be allowed if the product
banned is not the product being conserved. 98
Finally, even though the Tuna I Panel found that the measure could
not be applied outside the jurisdiction of the member nation, 99 in Tuna
II, the Panel found that Article XX(g) did not place any restrictions on
the locations of the natural resource to be protected. 2°°
195. Appelate Body on Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 78, at *13.
196. See 1996 Guidelines, supra note 28.
197. See Tuna I Panel Report, supra note 7, 11 5.10-5.16. See also Tuna 11 Panel
Report, supra note 7, U 5.6-5.10; and Alan Isaac Zreczny, The Process/Product Distinc-
tion and the Tuna/Dolphin Controversy: Greening the GATT Through International Agree-
ment, 1 BuFF. J. INT'L L. 79 (1994).
198. See Ted L. McDorman, The GATT Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes
to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolpins and Turtles, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L
& ECON. 477 (1991) (arguing that a broad reading of Article XX(b) would allow an un-
limited application of trade barriers).
199. See Tuna I Panel, supra note 7, $ 5.32.
200. See id.
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iii. Preamble to Article XX201
Originally, the Preamble was intended to prevent protectionist, or
discriminatory use of Article XX. The Appellate Body in Reformulated
Gasoline was the first GATT Panel to thoroughly review the Preamble.
In its consideration of the introductory provisions, the Appellate Body
stated:The chapeau is animated by the principle that while the exceptions
of Article XX may be invoked as a matter of legal rights, they should
not be so applied as to frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the
holder of the right under the substantive rules of the General Agreement.
If those exceptions are not to be abused or misused, in other words, the
measures falling within the particular exceptions must be applied reason-
ably, with due regard both to the legal duties of the party claiming the
exception and the legal rights of the other parties concerned. 2°2
As restated by the Appellate Body in Shrimp Import, the Appellate
Body in Reformulated Gasoline noted that the Preamble prohibits the ap-
plication of measures which constitute: (a) "arbitrary discrimination," (b)
"unjustifiable discrimination," or (c) "disguised restriction" on interna-
tional trade.203
In the Shrimp Imports decision, the most conspicuous flaw of Sec-
tion 609 was its "intended and actual coercive effect on the specific pol-
icy decision made by foreign governments, Members of the WTO. Sec-
tion 609, in its application, is, in effect an economic embargo which
requires all other exporting members ... to adopt essentially the same
policy as that applied to, and enforced on, United States'domestic shrimp
trawlers. ' ' 2°4 Any flexibility that existed in Section 609 was eliminated by
the 1996 Guidelines, which required that WTO Members adopt essen-
tially the same regulatory scheme as applied to the United States.205 The
1996 Guidelines totally failed to take into consideration the different con-
ditions found in the territories of WTO Members. The complainants ar-
gued that the cost to some fishermen of installing TEDs could be
equivalent to a year's income. The U.S. argument embarrassingly lacked
any consideration of the varying economic levels of citizens of WTO
Members. Furthermore, the U.S. was not permitting imports of shrimp
harvested by commercial trawlers with TEDs comparable to those re-
quired in the U.S., if those shrimp originated in waters of countries not
201. For the text of the Preamble to Article XX see supra note 74.
202. See Appellate Body on Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 78, at *15.
203. Id.
204. Appellate Body on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 161 (emphasis omitted).
205. See 1996 Guidelines, supra note 28.
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certified under Section 609.206
In Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body stated:[T]he United
States had not pursued the possibility of entering into cooperative agree-
ment with Venezuela and Brazil or, if it had, not to the point where it
encountered governments that were unwilling to cooperate. The record of
this case sets out the detailed justifications put forward by the United
States. But it does not reveal what, if any, efforts had been taken by the
United States to enter into the appropriate procedures in cooperation with
the government of Venezuela and Brazil so as to mitigate the administra-
tive problems pleaded by the United States.207
This theme of behavior should sound hauntingly familiar. In the Shrimp
Imports decision, the Appellate Body found that the record indicated no
serious efforts by the United States to attempt negotiations before imposi-
tion of the import ban.208 A review of recent WTO decisions reveals a
consistent pattern by the United States of not seeking international agree-
ments before implementing trade measures. 209 Even the trade measure in
contention in the Shrimp Imports case, Section 609(a) of the 1996 Guide-
lines, calls for the initiation of negotiations for the development of bilat-
eral or multilateral agreements with other nations.210
C. Does Might Make Right?
Environmentalists and academians complain that no environmental
trade measure has yet to be approved under the Article XX. Such a state-
ment sounds bleaker than it is. Out of the total number of ETMs, how
many are ever actually reviewed by a WTO dispute panel? The compara-
tively small number of WTO panel disputes leads to the conclusion that
the number of ETMs ruled as discriminatory is small. To carry this rea-
soning a step further, might this not also lead to the conclusion that the
complainants are actually dealing with unjustifiable discrimination? The
Shrimp Imports Appellate Body acknowledged the good intentions of the
U.S. but noted that Section 609, as implemented, was arbitrary and un-
justifiable discrimination. 21' However, the Appellate Body seems to sug-
gest that with modifications, such as eliminating discriminatory practices,
Section 609 would pass the tests of the Preamble to Article XX.2
12
206. See Appellate Body on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 165.
207. Appellate Body on Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 78, at *19.
208. See Appellate Body on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 166.
209. See generally Tuna I Panel Report, supra note 7; and Tuna H Panel Report,
supra note 7.
210. See 1996 Guidelines, supra note 28.
211. See Appellate Body on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, In 184-86.
212. Remember that the Appellate Body found that Section 609 did qualify as an
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The U.S. stance going into the Tuna I, Tuna II and Shrimp Imports
disputes demonstrated a complete turn around from the position it ini-
tially held when creating dispute resolution under GATT. When discuss-
ing dispute settlement under GATT, there were two views concerning
dispute resolution.2" 3 The first, the power-oriented model saw dispute res-
olution as a mere step in the negotiation process.214 The power oriented
model gave those with greater economic strength the upper hand, forcing
smaller nations to negotiate at a disadvantage.2 15 The second view of dis-
pute resolution was the rule-oriented model, giving deference to GATT as
a body of rules. 216 The rule-oriented approach was advocated by the U.S.
The implementation of the DSU clarified the rule-oriented model which
applies the dispute resolution rules equally to all members regardless of
the economic power of those parties.
The scope of this paper could not possibly cover the numerous in-
stances in which the United States has acted in a misguided fashion and
failed to admit to it. In the present situation it is easy for the United
States to claim to be only environmentally concerned for the conserva-
tion of sea turtles. After all the U.S. has suffered no real trade disadvan-
tages. The loss of shrimp from the complaining countries was simply bal-
anced by buying shrimp from other countries. This is not so for the
complainants. In Malaysia alone, shrimp exports to the U.S. in 1995
were valued at U.S. $ 9.1 million.21 7 In 1997, shrimp exports from Ma-
laysia fell to U.S. $1.47 million.218
Section 609 of the 1996 Guidelines issued by the U.S. Congress of-
fered no due process to the complainants. By order of the U.S. Congress,
the complainants were given a ridiculously short four months to imple-
ment the use of TEDs compared to three years given to other coun-
tries.219 The certification process under Section 609(b)(2) was not even
Article XX(g) exception, but failed under the tests found in the Preamble of Article XX.
See Appellate Body on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 141-42.
213. See generally INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DIsPuTE SET-
TLEMENT SYSTEM (Emst-Ulrich Petersman ed., 1997).
214. See PIERRE PESCATORE, HANDBOOK OF GATT DisPurE SETrLEMENr 71 (1991).
215. See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATIT SYSTEM 47-48 (1990).
216. See PESCATORE, supra note 214.
217. See WTO Orders U.S. to Remove Ban on Asian Shrimp, NEW STRAITS TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1998, at 17, available in 1998 WL 13398656.
218. See id.
219. See Appellate Body on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 9H 173-76. The Appellate
Body noted, "Under the 1991 and 1993 Guidelines, fourteen countries in the wider
Caribean/western Atlantic region had to commit themselves to require the use of TEDs
on all commercial shrimp trawling vessels by 1 May 1994. These fourteen countries had
a "phase-in" period of three years during which their respective shrimp trawling sectors
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predictable. 220 A country applying for certification was given no formal
opportunity to be heard, or to respond to any arguments made against it
in the course of certification. 22' Furthermore, applicants were not in-
formed as to whether or not certification was granted, nor offered a pro-
cedure for review or appeal from an application denial.
22
In the Shrimp Imports dispute, the U.S. Congress passed the 1996
Guidelines after a series of rulings by the U.S. CIT in Earth Island Insti-
tute v. Christopher,223 mandating that the government enforce Section 609
worldwide. 224 Several questions surface concerning this series of Earth
could adjust to the requirement of the use of TEDs. With respect to all other countries
exportingshrimp to the United States (including appellees, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and
Thailand), on 29 December 1995, the United States Court of International Trade directed
the Department of State to apply the import ban on a world-wide basis not later than I
May 1996. On 19 April 1996, the 1996 Guidelines were issued by the Department of
State bringing shrimp harvested in all foraign countries within the scope of Section 609,
effective 1 May 1996. Thus, all countries that were not among the fourteen in the wider
Carribean/western Atlantic region had only four months to implement the requirement of
compulsory use of TEDs." Id., 173 (footnote omitted).
220. See generally id., 177- 85.
221. See id., 180.
222. Countries which were granted certification are included in a list published in
the Federal Register. See Appellate Body on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 180.
223. The first Earth Island decision concerning shrimp imports was handed down on
December 29, 1995. See Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 19 Ct. Int'l Trade 1461,
913 F. Supp. 559 (CIT 1995). The court allowed the U.S. government five months to at-
tempt to implement worldwide Pub. L. 101-162, § 609. See id. at 580. The court granted
the government a year extension. The court finding the response by defendants insuffi-
cient, accelerated entry of final judgment to allow defendants to appeal. See Earth Island
Institute v. Christopher, 18 I.T.R.D. 1469, 922 F. Supp. 616 (CIT 1996). Defendants
failed to make a timely appeal. Further, plaintiffs claimed that the government had so
weakened the enforcement of the embargo so as to damage the goals of Section 609. See
generally Department of State, Revised Notice of Guidelines for Determining Compara-
bility of Foreign Programs for the Protection of Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Opera-
tions, 61 Fed. Reg. 17342 (Apr. 16, 1996); Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and
Int'l Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Certification Pursuant to Section 609 of Public
Law 101-162, 61 Fed. Reg. 24998 (May 17, 1996). In reply, the court ordered that the
embargo be enforced as enacted by Congress in Section 609(b)(2). See summary of the
U.S. CIT in Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 18 I.T.R.D. 2516, 948 F. Supp. 1062,
1065 (Nov. 25, 1996). In a November 25, 1996, decision in the Earth Island Institute
case, the U.S. CIT denied the government's request for stay pending appeal and reinstated
its prior judgment. See id.
224. See Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 18 I.T.R.D. 2516, 948 F. Supp. 1062
(1996). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated this ruling because the trial
court lacked jurisdiction over the matter due to the environmental group's withdrawal of
its motion to enforce. See Earth Island Institute v. Albright, 28 Envt'l L. Rep. 21,421,
147 F.3d 1352 (1998). In September 1998, several environmental groups including Earth
Island Institute filed another suit concerning the enforcement of shrimp embargoes under
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Island cases, including whether the U.S. CIT can force Congress to
amend a law.
A similar series of cases grew around the tuna-dolphin controversy
and the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 ("MMPA"). 225 The first
was Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher,226 where plaintiffs, headed by
the environmental activist group Earth Island Institute, sought a court or-
der to enforce the primary embargo provisions of the MMPA. The U.S.
government argued that the MMPA did not require action until findings
of violations under MMPA had been made. 227 The court disagreed and
ordered implementation of the embargo. 228 The National Marine Fisheries
Service ("NMFS") completed its findings the next day and lifted the em-
bargo. 229 Earth Island Institute challenged this action and the district court
invalidated NMFS's "reconsideration regulation." 230 A second suit was
brought to compel enforcement of the embargo provisions. 2 1 The govern-
ment argued that there was no reason to require formal certification from
a nation where there were no suspected violations.2 32 The court found
such discretion unwarranted and ordered certification against not only
primary nations but also from all intermediary nations.233 By the 1988
amendments to MMPA, the focus had shifted to enforcing conformity
through the threat of embargo. 23 4 After the implementation of these
amendments, no evidence in the legislative history shows that the U.S.
Section 609. See Earth Island Institute v. Daley, No. 98-09-02818, 1999 WL 224602 (CIT
Apr. 2, 1999). In that case, the CIT held that the 1998 Revised Guidelines, which would
permit the importation of TED-caught shrimp from uncertified nations, to be in violation
of Section 609. See id. at *15. However, before entry of judgment, the court will await
the defendant's annual report to Congress and the March 1999 Notice of Revisions. See
id. See also March 1999 Notice of Revisions, 64 Fed. Reg. 14482 (1999). The 1998 Re-
vised Guidelines can be found at 63 Fed. Reg. 46096 (1998).
225. Pub. L. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.S. §§
1361-1421(1994)).
226. 13 I.T.R.D. 1361, 929 F.2d 1449 (9t- Cir. 1991), aff'd 746 F Supp. 964 (N.D.
Cal. 1990).
227. See Earth Island Institute, 929 F.2d at 1452.
228. See id. at 1453.
229. See Taking and Related Acts Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations, 50
C.FR. § 216.24 (e)(5)(vii) (1993). For further discussion of this case see LouAnna C.
Perkins, International Dolphin Conservation Under U.S. Law: Does Might Make Right?,
1 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 213 (1995).
230. See Earth Island Institute, 929 F.2d at 1451-52.
231. See Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 13 I.T.R.D. 2368, 785 F. Supp. 826
(N.D. Cal. 1992).
232. See Earth Island Institute, 785 F. Supp. at 830.
233. See id. at 832.
234. See Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(A) (1988).
[Vol. 23
SHRIMP IMPORT PROHIBITIONS
Congress ever considered the propriety of using its economic powers to
enforce its own conservation goals. The resurfacing of the Earth Island
Institute in the shrimp-sea turtle issue, essentially challenging the govern-
ment in the same manner they did on the tuna-dolphin issue, rings a bell
of warning over power of some NGOs. Even more thought provoking are
the actions the Earth Island Institute forced the U.S. government to take
in both the tuna-dolphin controversy and the shrimp-sea turtle contro-
versy. The battle is not even over yet. An April 1999 decision by the
CIT found the 1998 Revised Guidelines, which permits the importation
of TED caught shrimp from uncertified nations, to be in violation of Sec-
tion 609.235 The court will wait for responses to the March 1999 Notice
of Revisions 236 before entering judgment.237
Nonetheless, the U.S. Government is responsible for its own actions.
In the Shrimp Imports decision, the Appellate Body acknowledged that
the differing implementation periods applied by the U.S. for Section 609
resulted from the U.S. CIT decision.238 Notwithstanding the actions of the
U.S. CIT, the Appellate Body stated, as had the previous Reformulated
Gasoline Appellate Body,239 "[t]he United States, like all other members
of the WTO and of the general community of states, bears responsibility
for acts of all its departments of government, including its judiciary." 24°
D. Environment vs. Trade: Seeking Solutions
The existence of a conflict between environmental protection and
liberalized trade is a misguided debate. In reality both environmental pro-
tection and liberalized trade are beneficial policies, inextricably interwo-
ven in today's global economy. Unfortunately, trade principles can be
easily enumerated while environmental standards are far less clear. The
WTO has attempted to give environmental issues greater consideration
through the creation of the WTO Committee of Trade and Environment
("CTE"). 241 At the meeting to sign the Final Act Embodying the Results
235. See 63 Fed. Reg. 46096 (1998).
236. 64 Fed. Reg. 14482 (1999).
237. See Earth Island Institute v. Daley, supra note 224, 15.
238. See Appellate Body on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 173.
239. See Appellate Body on Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 78, at *19.
240. See Appellate Body on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 173. For further infor-
mation see for example, OPPENHEIMER'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 1 545 (Jennings et al
eds., 91h ed. 1992) and IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 450
(Clarendon Press, 5th ed. 1998).
241. The general purpose of CTE was to make recommendations on "the need for
rules to enhance the positive interaction between trade and environment measures for the
promotion of sustainable development." See Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Dec. 13,
1996, 36 I.L.M. 218 (1997). See also infra note 264.
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of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Marrakesh
on April 14, 1994,242 members adopted a Ministerial Decision that for-
mally established CTE.243 Unfortunately, at the recent Singapore Confer-
ence, CTE failed to establish any concrete rules or regulations, but the
report may serve as a foundation for progress in the future.244
Numerous solutions to resolve the conflict have been suggested by
both the academic and the legal community. This paper will consider
only a few, since the list could potentially go far beyond the scope of
this paper. There is no single solution, but rather a combination of
solutions.
Sustainable development can not be achieved unless the abusers of
natural resources pay. Market-based protections such as competitive sus-
tainability may offer a partial solution. One of the tenets of competitive
sustainability, which is recognized by both "free traders" and environ-
mentalists, is the need to internalize production costs. 245 Domestic mar-
kets could require production permits, requiring fees for the privilege of
polluting. 246 Setting up such a system internationally would be difficult
without first establishing a multinational regulatory framework. Such a
system has been brought up in discussions on global climate change.247
Critics stress that market-based strategies tend to work well only with
conventional environmental threats. 248
242. See GATr, supra note 6.
243. See Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 241.
244. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Committee on Trade and Environ-
ment, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/40 (Nov. 7, 1996) (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http://
www.wto.org>. See also Steve Charnovitz, Critical Guide to the WTO's Report on Trade
and the Environment, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 341 (1997); Thomas J. Schoenbaum,
International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Recon-
ciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L. 268 (1997).
245. See Robert F. Housman and Durwood J. Zaelke, Trade, Environment and Sus-
tainable Development: A Primer, 15 HASTINGS INT'L. & COMP. L. REV. 535, 605-06
(1992). For a full discussion of competitive sustainability see Robert Housman and
Durwood Zaelke, Making Trade and Environmental Policies Mutually Reinforcing: Forg-
ing Competitive Sustainability, 23 ENVT'L L. 545 (1993). See also Frank Ackerman,
Waste Management: Taxing the Trash Away, ENVIRONMENT, June 1992, at 2; and Ursula
Kettlewell, The Answer to Global Pollution? A Critical Examination of the Problems and
Potential of the Polluter Pays Principle, 3 COLO. J. INT'L. ENVT'L. POL'Y 429 (1992).
246. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §7651(b) (1991)
(electrical utilities pollution allowances). See generally Larry B. Parker et al., Clean Air
Act Allowance Trading, 21 ENVT'L L. 2021 (1991).
247. See, e.g, Donald M. Goldberg, REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: A COM-
BINED STARTEGY USING PERMITS, FEES AND COUNTRY COMMITMENTS 2 (Feb. 1992) (on
file with the Center for International Environmental Law).
248. See generally Joel Mintz, Economic Reform of Environmental Protection: A
Brief Comment on a Recent Debate, 15 HARV. ENvT'L. L. REV. 85 (1991); Robert Hous-
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Daniel Esty suggested the creation of a Global Environmental Or-
ganization ("GEO") which would function alongside GATT, ruling on
environmental issues.249 For the GEO to be successful, a set of environ-
mental principles must be created for environmental policy like the free
market principles which exist for liberalized trade.25 0 However, environ-
mental issues tend to be less important to developing states, so it may be
hard to convince low-level states to join. The International Chamber of
Commerce ("ICC") developed a proposal to reduce conflict between en-
vironmental policy and trade policy. The ICC suggests that trade sanc-
tions to enforce environmental objectives should be avoided. 25 For devel-
opment of an environmental policy having a minimal effect on liberalized
trade, the ICC proposal outlines eight policy guidelines. The guidelines
include:reliance on market-oriented measures that encourage innovation;
harmonization of national standards; transparency of environmental poli-
cies and regulations to ensure they do not become non- tarrif barriers;
enforcement of standards and regulation in a non-discriminatory fashion,
in accordance with GATT most-favoured-nation and national treatment
obligations; establishment of standards based on sound science; and in-
corporation into international environmental agreements of methods for
measuring compliance and enforcement. 252
Academians and environmentalists still argue for the use of unilat-
eral trade measures. Separating unilateral trade measures into two catego-
ries, Robert Hudec has suggested that unilateral enforcement of environ-
mental policy through trade is possible.253 The first type is the altrusitic
trade measure which is designed to induce foreign nations or individuals
to change their behavior in ways to improve the environment. The sec-
ond type, the "level-playing-field" measures are designed to offset any
competitive disadvantage a producer in a developed nation may suffer
man and Durwood Zaelke, Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Development: A Primer,
15 HASTINGS INT'L. & COMP. L. REv. 535 (1992).
249. See DANIEL C. EsTY, GREENING THE GAY'T: TRADE ENVIRONMENT AND THE FU-
TURE 78-83 (1994).
250. See id.
251. See International Chamber Seeks Rules on Link Between Environment and
Trade, 8 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1817 (1991).
252. Id. For further discussion see generally Charles Fletcher, Comment, Greening
World Trade: Reconciling GATT and Multilateral Environmental Agreements Within the
Existng World Trade Regime, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 341 (1996).
253. See id. at 361 (citing Robert E. Hudec, GATT! Legal Restraints on the Use of
Trade Measures Against Foreign Environmental Practices 1-2 (unpublished manuscript)
(presented at a conference in Washington, D.C. titled "Domestic Policy Divergence in an
integrated World Economy: Fairness Claims and the Gains from Trade" on Sept. 30 and
Oct.1 1994) (copy on file with Charles R. Fletcher)).
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versus producers in nations with low or nonexistent environmental stan-
dards.25 4 Both MMPA and Section 609 are altruistic measures. The dis-
criminatory nature of altruistic trade measures has already been demon-
strated by the Tuna I, Tuna H and Shrimp Imports decisions. Even the
"level-playing-field" meaure seems more concerned with benefitting the
more powerful states. These types of measures reek strongly of protec-
tionism for the domestic industry of the powerful nation. Academians ar-
gue that without such measures high-pollution industries will move to na-
tions with low environmental stardards. 255 World Bank economists
disagree with this assumption. 256 Industries move to take advantage of
low labor costs and access to raw materials, not because of low environ-
mental standards. 257
E. Big Brother
Without argument, all areas of environmental conservation are re-
quired in order to maintain the Earth for future generations. Nonetheless,
should that goal come at the cost of countries not on the same economic
level or policy path as the U.S.? What was it that our forefathers indeli-
bly inked into the Declaration of Independence? 258 They believed we
were all created equal and had certain inalienable rights. Moreover, any
government that failed to guarantee those rights should be abolished.
Granted they were speaking of U.S. citizens, but how can we hold such a
high standard for ourselves and at the same time attempt to force other
less powerful countries to conform to our whims? Critics would probably
argue that the Declaration of Independence was merely rhetorical and not
substantive. Is the Declaration of Independence only a string of words ar-
ranged in a stylistic manner merely to influence its reader? In reality, the
Declaration of Independence was not mere bombast, but rather served as
the seeds through the U.S. Constitution for much of the substantive law
in the United States. If U.S. citizens hold their own rights so high, can
we, as a country, without guilty conscious, deny others of their rights?
An excellent book which quotes the Declaration of Independence is
1984 by George Orwell. Those overly critical of the WTO should reread
that book. Following a path to save the environment from future destruc-
tion is unarguably a required path in this day and age. The problem is
254. See Fletcher, supra note 249, at 2.
255. See Brian Copeland and M. Scott Taylor, North-South Trade and the Environ-
ment, 109 Q.J. ECON. 755, 757 (1994).
256. See World Bank Economist Denies U.S. Policies on Pollution Prompt Firms to
Move Overseas, 15 Int'l Envt'l L. Rep. (BNA) (1992) at 104 (citing empirical evidence).
257. See id.
258. See DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, United States, July 4, 1776.
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that the United States does not rule the world, even if we are a super-
power. Do we want to allow ourselves to become "Big Brother?" 2 9 For
many WTO Members, the WTO offers one of the few international op-
portunities to bring forth disputes revolving around issues where they
feel an injustice has been done.
The environment can be saved without oppressing other countries
and peoples. There must be room for faith in human progress, and man's
capacity to create a world of justice and peace. Numerous international
documents and agreements, such as the 1992 Rio Declaration on Envi-
ronment and Development, 26° the 1992 Convention on Biological Diver-
sity,261 the 1979 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Spe-
cies of Wild Animals,262 Agenda 21263 and the Decision of Ministers at
Marrakesh to establish a permanent Committee on Trade and Environ-
ment 264 discourage the use of unilateral actions to protect the environ-
259. For a better understanding of the author's point, and a dose of reality see gen-
erally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1950).
260. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, The Final Text of
Agreements Negotiated by Governments at the United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development (UNCED), June 3-14, 1992, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Specifically,
the text of Principle 12 states: "Environmental measures addressing transboundary or
global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an international
consensus." Id.
261. Article 5 of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity states: "each con-
tracting party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate, cooperate with other contracting
parties or, where appropriate, through competent international organizations, in respect of
areas beyond national jurisdiction and on other matters. of mutual interest, for the conser-
vation and sustainable use of biodiversity." Convention on Biological Diversity (June 4,
1993) S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-20, available in 1993 WL 796847 (Treaty), *6.
262. While not all parties in the Shrimp Imports dispute are parties to this Conven-
tion, the relevant sea turtles are listed in Annex I as "Endangered Migratory Species."
The Preamble of this Convention provides: "The contracting parties [are] convinced that
conservation and effective management of migratory species of wild animals requires the
concerted action of all states within the national boundaries of which such species spend
any part of their life cycle." (emphasis added).
263. Agenda 21 states that governments should "[s]eek to avoid the use of trade re-
strictions or distortions as a means to offset differences in cost arising from differences in
environmental standards and regulations." Agenda 21, June 14, 1992, ch. 2, § 2.22(i).
264. Part of the terms of reference for the Committee on Trade and Environment in-
cluded: "the avoidance of protectionist trade measures, and adherence to effective multi-
lateral disciplines to ensure responsiveness if the multilateral trading system to environ-
mental objectives set forth in Agenda 21, and the Rio Declaration, in particular Principle
12; and surveillance of trade measures used for environmental purposes, of trade-related
aspects of environmental measures which have significant trade effects, and of the effec-
tive implementation of the multilateral disciplines governing those measures." See Minis-
terial Decision on Trade and Environment, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uru-
guay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, April 14, 1994, Marrakesh, Morocco. See
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ment and encourage states to seek an international consensus to address
such issues. The actions of the United States have not necessarily demon-
strated a great concern for the conservation of sea turtles. The U.S. never
raised concern over sea turtles at the recent CITES conferences, which
would have offered greater possibilities for multilateral actions. The U.S.
failed to sign the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species
and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The U.S. has
not even ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity approved at Rio
de Janeiro in 1992. All of these conventions were aimed at protecting sea
turtles. The U.S. wants commitment from other states for conservation
but is not willing to commit itself.
The Appellate Body on Shrimp Imports noted that a more appropri-
ate solution, instead of the 1996 Guidelines, would have been a multi-
lateral agreement similar to the Inter-American Convention 261 signed by
the U.S., Brazil, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Venezuela. The U.S. made
no attempt to negotiate such an agreement with the complaining states.
As further proof that the U.S. paid no attention to possible lessons
learned, a 1996 casenote by then law student, Charles Fletcher, men-
tioned a theory derived from a discussion after a lecture at Florida State
University.266 The theory, in reference to the Tuna II decision, focused on
an import certification requirement. The theory states: To achieve the
goal of the MMPA-the elimination of fishing techniques that kill dol-
phins-the United States could require certification from tuna importers
that the tuna was caught using "dolphin safe" methods. This approach
would be an action within national jurisdiction which would enforce an
environmental standard on individuals catching fish, for import into the
United States, in international and foreign waters. . . . The certification
requirement would not place an affirmative requirement on a foreign na-
tion to alter national policies, as did the MMPA. Perhaps of more impor-
tance, however, is that the certification requirement is more narrowly tai-
also Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 235. Recently, on March 15, 1999,
the World Trade Organization held its second High Level Symposium on Trade and Envi-
ronment. See International Institute fro Sustainable Development Report on the WTO's
High-Level Symposium on Trade and Environment (Mar. 15-16, 1999), Geneva, Switzer-
land, available in <http://www.wto.org> (visited May 30, 1999).
265. The Appellate Body noted, "The Inter-American Convention thus provides
convincing demonstration that an alternative course of action was reasonably open to the
United States for securing the legitimate policy goal of its measure, a course of action
other than the unilateral and nonconsensual procedures of the import prohibition under
Section 609." Appellate Body on Shrimp Imports, supra note 1, 171.
266. See Fletcher, supra note 249, at 355 (citing Professor Joel Trachman, Ball
Chair Lecture at Florida State University College of Law (Feb. 22 1995) (notes on file
with Charles Fletcher)).
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lored to achieve its goal. No arbitrary distinctions would be made on the
basis of national origin because the regulation would apply to all fishing
vessels catching fish for sale in the United States. Arguably, this type of
process could be used to enforce any production process method require-
ments, as long as a similar requirement is placed on like products
whether imported or domestic.267
Sound familiar? Such an approach may have allowed Section 609 to
fall within the exceptions to Article XX. After the Shrimp Imports Ap-
pellate ruling, the U.S. government issued a public notice for amended
guidelines which would essentially switch the certification process to a
shipment-by-shipment basis as opposed to a nation-by nation basis.26
Critics will undoubtedly argue that certification on a shipment-by-
shipment basis, as suggested above, would weaken the effectiveness of
an environmental measure. However, Section 609 was certainly not the
only option the United States had in its arsenal of possible methods to
achieve conservation goals.269 Conservation of natural resources will un-
doubtedly fail miserably if not done with at least an attempt at coopera-
tive action.
V. CONCLUSION
Emerging in the U.S. is a growing disrespect for international law
and international environmental commitments. Emphasized by the nega-
tive reaction to the Shrimp Imports decision from environmental groups,
developing countries can only marvel at the arrogance of the U.S. There
is little that many countries can do to overcome injustices done at the
hands of the U.S.. For many developing countries, the WTO Dispute
Panels are one of the few opportunities available to challenge discrimina-
tory actions of more powerful nations. The citizens of the U.S., including
academians, government employees, environmentalists, and those in the
legal profession, have an ethical obligation, to the best of our ability, to
assure that the U.S. does not follow a path that would lead to the oppres-
267. Id.
268. This public notice can be found on the Sea Turtle Restoration Project
("STRP") website at <http://www.earthisland.org/strp/shipguidelines.html> (visited Jan. 5,
1999). The actual 1998 Revised Guidelines can be found at 63 Fed. Reg. 46096 (1998).
269. See Aadiya Mattoo and Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade Environment and the WTO:
The Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to Article XX of GATT, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 338 (Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann ed., 1997).
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sion of other states. The world and the environment can be saved
through wise choices, made easier by the realization that environmental
conservation and liberalized trade are two sides of the same path.
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